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Outline
 The database reconstruction theorem, a.k.a. the fundamental 
law of information recovery
 What is a privacy-loss budget?
 How do you respect a privacy-loss budget?
 How do you prove that the rate of privacy loss in published 
data is consistent with the budget?
 What does it mean to prove that the released data are robust 
to all future attacks?
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The Database Reconstruction Theorem
 Powerful result from Dinur and Nissim (2003) [link]
 Too many statistics published too accurately from a 
confidential database exposes the entire database with 
certainty
 How accurately is “too accurately”? 
 Cumulative noise must be of the order 𝑁
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Database Reconstruction II
 Led quickly to “differential privacy”: 
 Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith (2006) [link]
 Dwork (2006) [link] 
 Leading formal privacy model
5
Database Reconstruction III
 “The Fundamental Law of Information Recovery” 
 Dwork and Roth, 2014 [link]
 Dwork, undated [link]
 Includes extensions found in 
 Dwork, McSherry and Talwar (2007) [link]
 Muthukrishnan and Nikolov (2012) [link]
 Kasiviswanathan, Rudelson and Smith (2013) [link]
 Dwork, Smith, Steinke, Ullman, and Vadhan (2015) [link]
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Historical Note
 The U.S. Census Bureau: first organization in the world to use a 
formally private confidentiality protection system in production
 OnTheMap (residential side)
 Machanavajjhala, Kifer, Abowd, Gehrke, and Vilhuber (2008) 
[link]
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What is a Privacy-loss Budget?
 Not a dollar budget, but works the same way
 Constrains aggregate risk of partial database reconstruction 
given all published statistics
 Worst-case limit to the inferential disclosure of any identity or 
item
 In differential privacy, worst case is over all possible databases 
with the same schema for all individuals and items
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Why Use Worst-case Protection?
 “Worst case” is “equal protection under the law”
 Protects every person in the population the same way
 Anyone who might have been selected for the census or survey, 
whether in the database or not
 “Average-case” protection does not
 Can identify who is advantaged or disadvantaged a priori
9
Respecting a Privacy-loss Budget
 All released statistics can never permit a database 
reconstruction more accurate than the budget
 Protection into the indefinite future 
 For differential privacy, guarantee is over all future attackers 
and any database with the same schema
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Current Context
 Don’t current confidentiality laws require data stewards to respect 
a privacy-loss budget, at least implicitly?
 Unclear
 Law are silent on limitations of what can be learned about the 
confidential data from the released statistics (database 
reconstruction)
 All data publication inherently involves some inferential disclosure 
risk; otherwise, it is useless
 Dwork and Naor (2008) [link]: impossibility theorem
 Kifer and Machanavajjhala (2011)  [link]: no free lunch theorem
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This Is Not a New Problem
 Ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter is constant 
 Ancients didn’t understand irrational numbers:
 Babylonians: π = 3 Τ1 8
 Egyptians: π = 4 × Τ8 9
2
 Israelites: π = 3 [Talmud legislated value]
 Hindu: 𝜋 =
62,832
20,000
= 3.1416
 Euclid: no rational number is exact for this problem
 Archimedes: sequences can approximate 𝜋 with increasing accuracy
 But legal documents continued to use crude approximations
 Takes time to process abstract ideas into practical laws
 Legal guidance on inferential disclosure limitation is important 
 But must be constructed sensibly
Source: Beckman, Petr “A History of Pi” (1971) [link]
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Example: Randomized Response
 Randomized response is provably privacy-loss protective
 Privacy loss bounded by the maximum Bayes factor
max𝐵𝐹 =
𝑃𝑟 𝑆𝑄 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠|𝐴 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠
𝑃𝑟 𝑆𝑄 = 𝑁𝑜|𝐴 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠
𝑃𝑟 𝑆𝑄 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠
𝑃𝑟 𝑆𝑄 = 𝑁𝑜
=
𝑃𝑟 𝐴 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠|𝑆𝑄 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠
𝑃𝑟 𝐴 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠|𝑆𝑄 = 𝑁𝑜
=
ൗ1 2 + 1 − ൗ
1
2 ൗ
1
2
1 − ൗ1 2 ൗ
1
2
= 3
 Bound is the logarithm of the maximum Bayes factor
 If 
 Sensitive question asked with probability ½ 
 And innocuous question is “yes” with probability ½
 Then the maximum Bayes factor is 3, and ln 3 = 1.1
 The privacy-loss expenditure (𝜀-differential privacy) is 1.1
 Sources: Warner (1965) [link] and Greenberg, Abdel-Latif, Simmons, and Horvitz (1969) [link]. SDL 
uses: Fienberg and Steele (1998) [link], Du and Zhan (2003) [link] and Erlingsson, Vasyl and Korolova
(2014) [link].
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What Happens to Data Quality?
 Use relative sampling precision
𝑅𝑒𝑙. 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝑃𝑟 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑄 2
𝑛
𝜃 1 − 𝜃
𝑛
𝜃 1 − 𝜃
=
1
2
2
= 0.25
 If
 Privacy loss is ln 3 
 Then, relative sampling precision is 25% of the most accurate estimator
14
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Disclosure Limitation is Technology
 The price of increasing data quality (public “good”) in terms of 
increased privacy loss (public “bad”) is the slope of the 
technology frontier:
 Economics: Production Possibilities Frontier (Risk-Return in finance)
 Forecasting models: Receiver Operating Characteristics Curve
 Statistical Disclosure Limitation: Risk-Utility Curve (with risk on the x-
axis)
 All exactly the same thing
 None able to select an optimal point
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Where social 
scientists act like 
MSC = MSB
Where computer 
scientists act like 
MSC = MSB
Some Examples
 Dwork (2008): “The parameter e in Definition 1 is public. The 
choice of e is essentially a social question and is beyond the 
scope of this paper.” [link, p. 3]
 Dwork (2011): “The parameter e is public, and its selection is a 
social question. We tend to think of e as, say, 0.01, 0.1, or in 
some cases, ln 2 or ln 3.” [link, p. 91]
 In OnTheMap, e = 8.9, was required to produce tract-level 
estimates with acceptable accuracy
18
How to Think about the 
Social Choice Problem
 The marginal social benefit is the sum of all citizens’ 
willingness-to-pay for data quality with increased privacy loss
 Can be estimated from survey data
 The next slide shows how
See Abowd and Schmutte (2015) [link].
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Estimated 
Marginal Social 
Benefit Curve
Social Optimum: 
MSB = MSC
How to Prove That a Privacy-loss Budget 
Was Respected
 Must quantify the privacy-loss expenditure of each publication
 The collection of the algorithms taken altogether must satisfy 
the privacy-loss budget
 Requires methods that compose
21
How to Prove That the Algorithms are 
Resistant to All Future Attacks
 Information environment is changing much faster than before
 It may no longer be reasonable to assert that a product is 
empirically safe given best-practice disclosure limitation prior 
to its release
 Formal privacy models replace empirical assessment with 
designed protection
 Resistance to all future attacks is a property of the design
22
The Silver Lining
 American Statistical Association on p-values [link]
 Call for more nuanced use 
 Data analysis conducted using privacy-preserving methods: 
 Control the false discovery rate 
 Reduce inferential errors due to multiple comparisons
 Examples: Erlingsson, Vasyl and Korolova (2014) [link]; Dwork et al. (2015) [link]; 
Apple (2016) [link] 
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A Long Row to Hoe
 Concerted research and engineering effort needed to bring 
disclosure limitation into the 21st century
 Scientific integrity requires that we tackle this challenge
 First step is experimentation with the technologies known to 
work:
 Synthetic data with validation using formally private synthesizers
 Privacy-preserving data analysis via pre-specified query systems
24
Thank you.
john.maron.abowd@census.gov
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